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Thesis: Marine unmanned squadrons (VMU) are on the precipice of history with the forthcoming introduction of precision munitions to RQ-78 Shadow UAS. Marine leaders recognize that VMUs neeq consistent advocacy. An unmanned aerial systems aircraft commander primary military occupation specialty transition board convenes in the summer of 2011. Eight aviators with fighter and/or attack backgrounds must permanently transition to VMU squadrons. These officers will lead VMU fires integration intothe Marine Corps offensive air support architecture.
Discussion: Over the past nine years the Air Force adapted personnel policies as it strove to merge manned and unmanned aviation platforms. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) existed in a vacuumuntil weaponized. Once armed, experienced fighter/bomber aircrew were required to Ef!nsure proper employment of UAS ordnance. Initially, the Air Force involuntarily assigned pilots to UAS squadrons. At one point 75% of Predator pilots had fighter/bomber backgrounds. Reduced tour lengths, choice of follow-on assignment, and aviation career incentive pay changes increased pilot volunteer rates. Although Air Force and Marine Corps culture is different at the organizational level, their pilot culture is remarkably similar; The Marine Corps will .be challenged by the need to assign highly qualified aviation fires rntegrators to VMU squadrons. The Air Force broke its manpower mold in order to properly train and man Predator squadrons. In order to properly train and man VMU squadrons the Marine Corps must follow the Air Force's lead and ensure eminently qualified aviators are assigned to· VMU squadrons.
Marine aviation fires integrators exist along a spectrum from the non-combat arms TBS graduate (classified as "level one") to the FAC(A) with a ground Forward Air Controller tour (level five). The Marine Corps must assign pilots and weapon system operators (WSO) to VMU squadrons who come from the FjA.:.ts, AV-88, or AH/UH-1 communities. These aviators.have unique aviation fires integration skills. They will conduct VMU fires· training and create a "fires-centric" culture. VMUs present uniqu~ training challenges. Initial training is outsourced to the Army, and the laser designator is not utilized at the Army school. Marine VIVIUs do not have a dedicated training squadron. VMU officers at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One {IVIAWTS-1) do not have aviation fires integration backgrounds. Marine leaders cannot "cast the net widely" and ex;pect to "fix it with training" in the case of armed UAS. In this case there is no substitute for knowledgeable leaders who can set the conditions for success.
. Sufficient numbers of qualified personnel exist to fill VMU fires subject matter expertise requirements. Marine F/A-18 weapon system operators (WSO) are the obvious first answer. Junior WSO·majors should be targeted for transition. The Marine Corps is 128% of grade adjusted recapitulation {GAR) for WSOs. Other communities can provide manpower to VMU squadrons as well. Most platforms have similar overages inMajors due to the need for less mid-level leadership (the grade shape "pyramid"). The challenge is to incentivize the target population correctly. It is unlikely that captains and junior majors from the strike community will volunteer for transition to VMU squadrons.
Conclusion:
Solutions ranging from low to high impact are available. At the low impact end of the spectrum, the summer .2011 transition board must set precepts to ensure that eight aviators with strike backgrounds transition to unmanned aerial systems aircraft commander. Follow-on transition boards should select only aviators with the 7502 Forward Air Controller secondary MOS. The mediumimpact cours·e of action calls for delaying the summer 2011 transition board until Marine UAS are armed. Marines generally have a higher regard for platforms with kinetic effects. Once UAS begin dropping ordnance all eyes will turn in their direction, and scrutiny will follow. Armed UAS are several years away, but a fires-centric culture must be established now in order to set the conditions for success. The timing of the first transition board is unfortunate with respect to attracting the target audience. Finally, Marine leaders may need to involuntarily assign personnel to permanent duty as UAS aircraft commanders. The Air Force made a difficult, but correct choice in this matter. If Marine leaders enact a similar plan, those aviators invohJntarily assigned must receive substantial incentives. Organic weaponized persistent stare capability is just a few years away for the MAGTF. The opportunity for increased synergy is commensurate to the friction that will result if VMU personnel cannot properly integrate fires. The stakes are deceptively high, and now is the time to act decisively. Assigning expert aviation fires integrators to the unmanned systems aircraft commander MOS is the first step toward good to great VMU squadrons.
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The re-adoption of the term "remotely piloted aircraft" (RPA) in reference to Air Force UAS is the most recent evidence of the cultural conflict that.UAS impose on Air Force traditions. 10 Due to the high mishap rate that Predator .
. experienced during its ACTO phase, Air Force leaders were convinced that only rated pilots c·ould bring the r:nishap rate down to acceptable levels.
Air Force leaders ensured theright pilots were assigned to Predator squadrons by Force could subject them to check rides that were equivalent to manned aircraft, thus subjecting them to the threat of a flight-evaluation board and not award flight gate credit. 15 The MAF pilots to Predator squadrons to address these issues. 18 Predator squadrons rely upon the expertise of CAF pilots during high-tempo combat operations. ,.
including UAS fires integration. "P11ots 1~ will no longer be required. ·/ ··eon:utiunity . The number of electronic warfare {EW) officers assigned to VMU squadrons is relatively low at 3%. EW officers have an understanding of "fires" in a theoretical sense, as Marine Corps doctrine includes EW as a subset offires. Whether or not an EW, officer understands the intricacies of CAS execution depends upon how far he progressed in his primary MOS ~raining before his VMU assignment (see Figure 3 for average time in service prior to arrival at VMU}.
Since an officer's assignment to a VMU squadron is by definition outside his primary MOS it is " " unlikelythat many VMU EW officers at the captain or major levels attend the Marine Aviation
Weapons and Tactics Instructor course {WTI) prior to serving in a VMU. • Aviators do not like being assigned to the VMUs; however, 72XX officers do.
• Company grade aviators actively seek reassignment out of the VM Us before the end of their 3-year tours.
• Aviators assigned to the VMU have been placed there because they are not the best aviators.
.
Bullet one is subjective in nature. However, bullet two has positive confirmation (see Figure 2) . too, acknowledges that there is no substitute for experie.nce delivering fires from a strike platform in the air combined with the ''boots in the dirt" perspective of a ground FAC.
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The data in Table 2 In theory a RQ-7B Shadow UAS is a tremendous combat multiplier, allowing FACs to sort targets via full motion video and utilize the laser designator to host bombs from strike aircraft.
However, VIVIU WTI candidates are not receiving sufficient unit-level tactical training as evidenced by comments from both MAWTS-1 UAS instructors and air officer department staff.
When asked about the progress of Shadow laser designator tactics, a MAWTS-1 UAS instructor · stated, "Laser designator operations? At times we don't even trust the UAS crew's fuel was "not surprised" by the MAWTS-1 instructor feedback. 37 He went on to say that as the commanding officer he gave a two hour "chalk talk" tra.ining brief to his squadron prior to the first live fire employment of the Shadow.laser designator. Intended to validate tactical employmenttemplates, this occurred during a combat deployment in Operation Enduring 
Immediate Actions
Sufficient numbers of highly skilled fires integrators exist to fill the Summer 2011 UAS aircraft commander transition board requirement. The question is: will fires integration requirements be diluted as occurred in the Harvest Hawk fielding? Or will the Marine Corps take General Fogleman's "If this program fails, it won't be because of our pilots" mantra to heart? As discuss':!d earlier, the Air Force experienced improved. volunteer rates, retention rates, and morale after awarding aviation career incentive pay to rated pilots serving in UAS squadrons: The Marine Corps should take this experience into account and offer aviation continuation pay (ACP) to UAS aircraft commanders. operators a bonus larger than manned platforms require. In the near term UAS aircraft.
commanders will have manned aviation backgrounds. It is imperative that UAS aircraft commanders receive ACP on par with manned strike platforms.
Low Impact
The Summer 2011 transition board will establish the initial VMU fires integration cadre. 
Conclusion
Marine UAS operations are on the verge of following the Air Force from intelligencedriven, passive imagery collection to intelligence and operations-driv;n offensive air support.
Establishing a fires-centric culture sets conditions for the future success of weaponized.UAS. Anderson 33 Note:. Lighter than air vehicles will be categorized by the highest level of any of their operating criteria.
(I) Group I UA: Typically weighs less than 20 pounds and nonnally operates below 1200 feet AGL at speeds less than 250 knots.
(2) Group 2 UA: Typically weighs 21-55 pounds and nonnally operates below 3500 feet AGL at speeds less than 250 knots.
(3) Group 3 UA: Typically weighs more. than 55 pounds but less than 1320·pounds and normally operates below 18,000 feet MSL at speeds less than 250 knots.
(4) Group 4 UA: Typically weighs more than 1320 pounds and nonnally operates below 18,000 feet MSL at any speed.
(5) Group 5 UA: Typically weighs more than 1320 pounds and normally operates higher than 18,000 feet MSL at any speed. (13) (2) 6.5 11. 8 18.5
(n-size) (39)
Figure 2-Average years of commissioned service at time of arrival to the VrviU by occupational field and paygrade. 
I
1 Terminology referencing Unmanned Systems evolved from "drones" in the early evolution of these systems. Later they were referred to as remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and then as . aerial vehicles(UAV). The Air Force recently re-adopted the RPA terminology. This paper will use the today's universally accepted term UAS to refer to unmanned aircraft and related ground support systems. Unmanned a'ircraft (UA) will be reserved for reference solely to the air vehicle itself. ' ·
